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Abstract
By means of an intriguing physical example, magnetic surface
swimmers, that can be described in terms of Dennett’s intentional
stance, I reconstruct a hierarchy of necessary and sufficient conditions
for the applicability of the intentional strategy. It turns out that the
different levels of the intentional hierarchy are contextually emergent
from their respective subjacent levels by imposing stability constraints
upon them. At the lowest level of the hierarchy, phenomenal physi-
cal laws emerge for the coarse-grained description of open, nonlinear,
and dissipative nonequilibrium systems in critical states. One level
higher, dynamic patterns, such as, e.g., magnetic surface swimmers,
are contextually emergent as they are invariant under certain symme-
try operations. Again one level up, these patterns behave apparently
rational by selecting optimal pathways for the dissipation of energy
that is delivered by external gradients. This is in accordance with the
restated Second Law of thermodynamics as a stability criterion. At
the highest level, true believers are intentional systems that are stable
under exchanging their observation conditions.
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1 Introduction
Once upon a time, physicists A. Snezhko and I. S. Aranson from Argonne
National Laboratory in Illinois conducted an experiment on the coupling of
the electromagnetic field to hydrodynamics (Snezhko et al. 2005). They sus-
pended nickel microspheres over the surface of water in a beaker and applied
an alternating magnetic field perpendicular to the liquid-air interface. Fol-
lowing the magnetic field, the spheres, supported by the fluid’s surface ten-
sion, began to rotate thereby causing vortices that changed the spheres’ local
environment. As an intriguing consequence, processes of self-organization
and self-assembly took place: spheres aligned up to chains; chains arranged
in parallel to form segments and segments created large-scale patterns rem-
iniscent to worms or snakes (Snezhko et al. 2006, Belkin et al. 2007). Yet
these structures were not only static patterns, they dynamically generated
streams which were expelled by the two tails of the snake. Hence, a snake
stalled as a highly efficient water pump surrounded by a quadrupolar velocity
field (Belkin et al. 2007). Tuning the driving frequency of the magnetic field,
the system exhibited a dynamic instability when the pump of one tail got
stronger than the pump of the other tail. As a consequence of this symmetry
breaking, the snake started to move around (Snezhko et al. 2009). Moreover,
this symmetry breaking could has been caused also by putting a plastic bead
into the container. After some time of drifting around, the bead got incor-
porated into a snake, thus becoming its distinguished head by interrupting
the water stream at this site (Snezhko et al. 2009). The resulting complex
object, shown in Fig. 1, erratically swam around, exploring its environment
and snatching isolated nickel spheres that were also incorporated into the
structure. Thereby, the snake grew and accelerated further, becoming an
even more awesome predator.
2
Figure 1: Magnetic surface swimmer. Reprinted from Snezhko et al. (2009,
Fig. 1(d)) [Snezhko, A., Belkin, M., Aranson, I. S. & Kwok, W.-K. Physical
Review Letters, 102, 118103, 2009] with permission. Copyright (2009) by the
American Physical Society.
Snezhko and Aranson’s discovery of these co-called magnetic surface swim-
mers (Snezhko et al. 2009) has been brought to the public by the Wired
Science blog of Madrigal:1
These chains of metal particles look so much like real, living an-
imals, it is hard not to think of them as alive. . . . As it starts
heading for other chains of particles in an unpredictable and ec-
centric way, it’s nearly impossible not to anthropomorphize the
structure. It just acts too much like life. The damn thing prac-
tically has . . . personality. . . . ‘It also has a very bad temper,’
Aranson jokes, noting that this creature, this figment of nature,
appears to ‘hunt’ the other particles. Indeed it does. As you can
see in the video, the metallic monster, technically known as a
‘surface swimmer,’ acts hungry. As it snatches more particles, it
swims faster and faster.
Indeed, looking at the videos at Wired Science, it is tempting to regard
the snakes as hungry predators, desiring to catch as many nickel spheres as
possible and believing that they have to go stalking for them as they eagerly
1 http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/03/snakes/ where also a collection of
movies and further details is available (see also Snezhko and Aranson’s supplement http:
//mti.msd.anl.gov/highlights/snakes/).
3
demand food for survival. In other words, on the one hand, it is almost in-
evitable to adopt the intentional stance (Dennett 1978a, 1989a) in order to
describe and predict the behavior of these structures by ascribing beliefs and
desires to them. On the other hand, the physics of magnetic surface swim-
mers is completely understood in terms of the laws of Newtonian mechanics,
Maxwell’s electrodynamics and the phenomenal Navier-Stokes equation gov-
erning hydrodynamics (Belkin et al. 2010). But this puts physicists such
as Snezhko and Aranson to the very same place of the ‘cleverer observer’,
Dennett (1989b, pp. 23) discusses in his famous Martians example (Den-
nett 1989b, pp. 25) in order to address the alleged observer-dependence of
intentionality and hence of consciousness in general.
Therefore, the magnetic surface swimmer example illustrates firstly that
being a ‘cleverer observer’ does not prevent one from employing the inten-
tional strategy. But secondly, as I argue in this article, it also shows that in-
tentionality cannot be reduced to Laplacean physics because physical science
actually works very differently: The phenomenal laws of, e.g., thermodynam-
ics or hydrodynamics, are not completely reducible to a fundamental level
of, say, elementary particle physics (that is metaphorically often conceived
as classical point mechanics in the physicalist literature). The reason for this
is that fundamental levels of description only provide necessary but not suffi-
cient conditions for a description at a higher level. Sufficient conditions have
to be provided by contingent contexts which implement stability conditions
for the system’s dynamics at the lower level. Such a non-reductive relation
between different levels for the description of systems has been introduced
by Bishop and Atmanspacher (2006) and Atmanspacher and Bishop (2007)
as contextual emergence. In particular, Bishop (2008, 2012) demonstrates
how the nonlinear and dissipative properties of fluid dynamics emerge upon
purposefully and rationally chosen contexts.
The article is structured in the following way: In Sect. 2 I briefly re-
view Dennett’s operationalistic definition of intentional systems, while Sect.
3 delivers an overview about the theory of contextual emergence. In Sect. 4
I reconstruct the contextual emergence of intentionality in four steps, com-
prising a hierarchy of necessary and sufficient conditions: Subsection 4.1 dis-
cusses the emergence of those nonlinear laws that govern the self-organization
of dissipative nonequilibrium structures such as magnetic surface swimmers.
Subsection 4.2 then describes the emergence of these particular structures
by means of self-assembling patterns. Subsection 4.3 applies the concepts
of contextual emergence to Dennett’s definition of intentional systems. Sub-
section 4.4 concludes with the emergence of what Dennett (1989b, p. 27)
4
calls ‘true believers’. In Sect. 5 I resume the discussion concluding that true
believers are real observers.
2 Intentional Systems and True Believers
Dennett’s operationalistic definition of intentionality (Dennett 1978b, 1989b)
neglects the questions whether conscious beings ‘really have beliefs and de-
sires’ (Dennett 1989b, p. 22) and whether they are localized somewhere ‘in
the believer’s head’ (Dennett 1989b, p. 14).2 Dennett’s intentional strategy
is one of three possible strategies that can be employed by an observer who is
asked to describe and predict some system’s behavior: ‘. . . a particular thing
is an intentional system only in relation to the strategies of someone who is
trying to explain and predict its behavior’ (Dennett 1978b, pp. 3f).
Exemplified by means of a chess computer, Dennett (1978b, pp. 4ff)
demonstrates that an observer can firstly adopt the physical stance (cf. Den-
nett (1989b, p. 16)) regarding the system as a physical object comprised from
molecules, atoms or elementary particles (or interacting fields, as a physicists
could add) and governed by deterministic natural laws. In the ideal case, the
observer adopting the physical strategy is a Laplacean demon who is able to
apply his complete knowledge of natural laws to his complete knowledge of
initial conditions in order to compute any future state of the system under
study (Dennett 1989b, p. 23).
The second possibility for an observer is to adopt the design stance (Den-
nett (1978b, p. 4), Dennett (1989b, pp. 16f); sometimes referred to as the
functional stance (Bieri 1997)). The chess computer subjected to the design
stance is described by an algorithm that computes and weights all possible
moves in order to decide for the optimal one because it has actually been
designed for that aim (Dennett 1978b, p. 4).
Finally, the observer may adopt the intentional stance (Dennett (1978b,
p. 5), Dennett (1989b, p. 17)):
Sometimes even the design stance is practically inaccessible, and
then there is yet another stance or strategy one can adopt: the
intentional stance. Here is how it works: first you decide to treat
2 Or whether they are somehow neurally correlated (Chalmers 2000)).
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the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent;
then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given
its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what
desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally
you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in
the light of its beliefs. (Dennett 1989b, p. 17)
For the chess computer this means to treat ‘the machine rather like an
intelligent human opponent’ who rationally accepts the goal of the game and
its rules (Dennett 1978b, p. 5). Then the observer ascribes ‘to the system the
possession of certain information’ i.e. beliefs and supposes ‘it to be directed
by certain goals ’, i.e. desires (Dennett 1978b, p. 6). In other words:
Having doped out these conditions . . . we can proceed at once to
ascribe beliefs and desires to the creatures. Their behavior will
‘manifest’ their beliefs by being seen as the actions which, given
the creatures’ desires, would be appropriate to such beliefs as
would be appropriate to the environmental stimulation. Desires,
in turn, will be ‘manifested’ in behavior as those appropriate
desires (given the needs of the creature) to which the actions of
the creature would be appropriate, given the creatures beliefs.
The circularity of these interlocking specifications is no accident.
Ascriptions of beliefs and desires must be interdependent . . . .
(Dennett 1978b, pp. 8f)
This is an interesting point because the intentional stance here resem-
bles the ‘circular causality’ in the self-organization of complex systems as
described by synergetics (Haken 1983, Tschacher and Haken 2007). I come
back to this issue in the following sections.
Dennett (1978b, pp. 7f) concludes:
Lingering doubts about whether the chess-playing computer re-
ally has beliefs and desires are misplaced, for the definition of
intentional systems I have given does not say that intentional sys-
tems really have beliefs and desires, but that one can explain and
predict their behavior by ascribing beliefs and desires to them.
. . . All that has been claimed is that on occasion, a purely physical
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system can be so complex, and yet so organized, that we find it
convenient, explanatory, pragmatically necessary for prediction,
to treat it as if it had beliefs and desires and was rational.
This nicely illustrates Dennett’s operationalistic or instrumentalistic at-
titude. But now another problem arises:
The next task would seem to be distinguishing those intentional
systems that really have beliefs and desires from those we may
find it handy to treat as if they had beliefs and desires. . . . A
better understanding of the phenomenon of belief begins with the
observation that even in the worst of these cases, even when we
are surest that the strategy works for the wrong reasons, it is
nevertheless true that it does work, at least a little bit. This is
an interesting fact, which distinguishes this class of objects, the
class of intentional systems, from the class of objects for which
the strategy never works. (Dennett 1989b, pp. 22f)
Hence, the definition of an intentional system is that of a system which
can be successfully predicted by virtue of the intentional strategy. Moreover:
‘all there is to being a true believer is being a system whose behavior is
reliably predictable via the intentional strategy’ (Dennett 1989b, pp. 29).
However, the intentional strategy may work ‘for the wrong reasons’. Thus,
the last quotation has to be interpreted in the following way: Every true
believer is an intentional system, but not every intentional system must be
a true believer. That is, the intentional stance only provides a necessary
condition for being a true believer, while a sufficient condition must be sought
somewhere else.
According to the operationalistic definition of intentionality it would be
‘intolerable to hold that some artifact or creature or person was a believer
from the point of view of one observer, but not a believer at all from the point
of view of another, cleverer observer’ (Dennett 1989b, pp. 23f). Dennett
(1989b, p. 25) illustrates this problem by a famous Gedankenexperiment :
Suppose . . . some beings of vastly superior intelligence — from
Mars, let us say — were to descend upon us, and suppose that we
were to them as simple thermostats are to clever engineers. Sup-
pose, that is, that they did not need the intentional stance — or
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even the design stance — to predict our behavior in all its detail.
They can be supposed to be Laplacean super-physicists, capable
of comprehending the activity on Wall Street, for instance, at the
microphysical level. Where we see brokers and buildings and sell
orders and bids, they see vast congeries of subatomic particles
milling about — and they are such good physicists that they can
predict days in advance what ink marks will appear each day on
the paper tape labeled ‘Closing Dow Jones Industrial Average.’
They can predict the individual behaviors of all the various mov-
ing bodies they can observe without ever treating any of them
as intentional systems. Would we be right then to say that from
their point of view we really were not believers at all (any more
than a simple thermostat is)? If so, then our status as believers is
nothing objective, but rather something in the eye of the beholder
— provided the beholder shares our intellectual limitations.
Dennett (1989b, p. 25) immediately retorts:
Our imagined Martians might be able to predict the future of the
human race by Laplacean methods, but if they did not also see us
as intentional systems, they would be missing something perfectly
objective: the patterns in human behavior that are describable
from the intentional stance, and only from that stance, and that
support generalizations and predictions.
Stressing the Martians argument even further, Dennett (1989b, pp. 25f)
concludes that intentional acts are abstract and therefore not accessible at
the fundamental level of the physical stance. Finally, he invents a kind of
Turing test (Turing 1950) where an Earthling disguises himself as a Martian
to become treated as a proper intentional system. This eventually reveals
for Dennett (1989b, p. 27) ‘the unavoidability of the intentional stance with
regard to oneself and one’s fellow intelligent beings.’
3 Contextual Emergence
In the previous section I have already elucidated that the intentional stance
only supplies a necessary condition for being a true believer while the suffi-
8
cient conditions have to be somehow reconstructed from the concluding pe-
riod. Therefore it sounds reasonable to carry out this reconstruction in terms
of contextual emergence (Bishop and Atmanspacher (2006), Atmanspacher
and Bishop (2007), see also Atmanspacher and beim Graben (2009) for an
overview).
In general, science often considers different levels for describing one and
the same system. Physics, e.g., looks at an ideal gas in thermal equilibrium
as a huge collection of essentially non-interacting microscopic particles that
freely move around in a container colliding with each other and bouncing
the container’s boundaries in a deeply elastic manner. On a macroscopic
level, by contrast, an ideal gas in thermal equilibrium is described by the
phenomenal quantities pressure, volume and temperature that obey the ideal
gas law (Pitaevskii and Lifshitz 1981). As another example, the microscopic
state of a neural network is given through the activity of a large number of
individual neurons. On the other hand, macroscopic patterns of distributed
activity lead to neural macrostates serving as cognitive representations in
connectionist modeling (Amari 1974, beim Graben et al. 2009).
These examples raise the question of the logical connection between dif-
ferent levels of description. A dependency that is very prominent in the
philosophical literature is strong reduction when a lower level provides neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for a higher level. Another important example,
supervenience, refers to the case where a lower level only provides sufficient
but not necessary conditions for a higher level which means that a higher
level description could be multiple realized at the lower level. Less interest-
ing is the possibility that there are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions
between two levels, a case that has been referred to as radical emergence.
The last option offers necessary but not sufficient conditions for the higher
level at the lower level. If these are provided by a contingent context that
implements stability conditions at the lower level for the description at the
higher level, Bishop and Atmanspacher (2006) call this contextual emergence.
The importance of stability conditions resulted from a detailed investi-
gation of some peculiarities of quantum physics (Primas 1990b). Some of
the most pertinent philosophical problems of quantum theory, notably the
famous measuring problem, but also the emergence of classical quantities
such as temperature in quantum statistical mechanics, were not soluble in
von Neumann’s canonical codification of quantum mechanics (von Neumann
1955). However, these problems became tractable in the more powerful for-
mulation of algebraic quantum theory (Hepp 1972, Takesaki 1970, Primas
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2000).
Considering the paradigmatic example of thermodynamics again, one
firstly has to define the two levels of description. Clearly, the lower level
comprises the movements and collisions of a huge number of individual par-
ticles, described by a point in high-dimensional phase space that is spanned
by the particles’ positions and momenta in the classical picture of point
mechanics. In the same picture, the higher level is then prescribed by the
space of probability distribution functions over phase space, called statistical
states. These are the referents of classical statistical mechanics.3 However,
this statistical state space of probability distribution functions is much too
large to bear physically meaningful interpretations.4 Therefore, the space of
statistical states has to be substantially restricted to become operationally
and epistemically well-defined. This is achieved by the observer who chooses
a contingent context from a particular point of view (beim Graben 2011),
defining the relevant properties of the problem under study.5
Deliberately choosing a contingent context, introduces a coarse-graining
where singularities at the lower level are smoothed out at the higher level
by changing the problem’s topology.6 However, not every arbitrarily selected
context entails emergent properties. This requires the implementation of sta-
bility conditions at the lower level as a sufficient condition for the higher level
description. For the example of thermodynamics, stability refers to the con-
cept of thermal equilibrium which is alien to statistical mechanics. In physics
textbooks, the notion of thermal equilibrium is usually introduced by the
Zeroth Law, presenting an equivalence relation between physical systems:
An equilibrium system A is in equilibrium with itself (reflexivity). When
system A is in equilibrium with system B, then B is in equilibrium with A
also (symmetry). When A is in equilibrium with B and B with C then A is
in equilibrium with C (transitivity). By virtue of this relation, all systems
that are in thermal equilibrium with each other, become operationally indis-
tinguishable, thus forming an equivalence class, or likewise, the pattern at a
higher level of description.
3 Likewise, statistical states in quantum statistical mechanics are given as density
matrices.
4 In this respect, Primas (1990b, p. 241) talks about a mathematical ‘monster, which
contains myriads of unphysical states’.
5 Cf. also Dennett (1989b, p. 16): where ‘one ignores the actual (possibly messy)
details’ for the design stance.
6 Similarly such smoothing could be gained by asymptotic expansions, e.g. for sepa-
rating timescales (Primas 1998, Bishop and Atmanspacher 2006, Atmanspacher and beim
Graben 2007).
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At the lower level of description, thermal equilibrium states can be identi-
fied with particular statistical states, called Kubo-Martin-Schwinger (KMS)
states (Primas 1998, Bishop and Atmanspacher 2006). These are charac-
terized by three stability conditions: (1) temporal stability, (2) structural
stability, and (3) ‘forgetfulness’ (Haag et al. 1974, Atmanspacher and beim
Graben 2007).7 Interestingly, these equilibrium states can be also obtained
from the maximum entropy principle subsumed in the Second Law of ther-
modynamics. Using KMS states as reference states for the construction of
contextual observables, one obtains classical quantities such as temperature
through contextual emergence (Takesaki 1970, Primas 1998, Bishop and At-
manspacher 2006).
In dynamical systems theory, thermal equilibrium (KMS) states find their
counterparts as Sinai-Ruelle-Bowen (SRB) states on chaotic attractors (At-
manspacher and beim Graben 2007, Guckenheimer and Holmes 1983). In
a coarse-grained description, these can be suitably approximated through
Markov processes (Atmanspacher and beim Graben 2007, van Kampen 1992)
implementing the ‘molecular chaos assumption’ as a stability condition.8
4 Contextual Emergence of Intentionality
Now I have collected all required instruments for the reconstruction of inten-
tionality in terms of contextual emergence. In order to do so, I firstly define
the different levels of description. As already pointed out, only two levels
do not suffice for that aim. Therefore, I propose the intentional hierarchy in
Fig. 2 (cf. Jordan and Ghin (2006)).
7 I.e., (1) stationarity: KMS states do not change in time; (2) ergodicity: KMS states
are stable under parametric perturbations; (3) mixing: KMS states do not memorize
temporal correlations.
8 In fact, the important Boltzmann equation of physical kinetics is essentially a master
equation for a Markov process (van Kampen 1992, Pitaevskii and Lifshitz 1981).
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Figure 2: Intentional hierarchy.
First of all, intentional systems must be physically realized, e.g. as phys-
ical symbol systems (Newell 1980), presenting the universe of discourse in
Fig. 2. A subset of these are particular dynamical systems, namely non-
linear dissipative nonequilibrium systems. These contain the systems for
which Dennett’s intentional stance works, i.e. the class of intentional sys-
tems. Finally, a subclass of intentional systems are ‘true believers’, systems
which really have beliefs and desires in comparison to systems ‘we may find
it handy to treat as if they had beliefs and desires’ (Dennett 1989b, p. 22).
The subset relations in Fig. 2 also denote entailment relations: being a
true believer entails being an intentional system; being an intentional system
entails being a nonlinear dissipative nonequilibrium system; and being a non-
linear dissipative nonequilibrium system entails being a physical system. Ac-
tually this indicates the necessary relations for contextual emergence: being a
physical system is necessary for being a nonlinear dissipative nonequilibrium
system; being a nonlinear dissipative nonequilibrium system is necessary for
being an intentional system; and being an intentional system is necessary for
12
being a true believer.
First of all, a necessary condition for a nonlinear dissipative nonequilib-
rium system is certainly that such a system is a physical system. Secondly,
one necessary condition for an intentional system is to have a nonequilibrium
dynamical system. This is nicely illustrated by means of Dennett’s lectern
example:
For instance, it seems the lectern in this lecture room can be
construed as an intentional system, fully rational, believing that
it is currently located at the center of the civilized world (as some
of you may also think), and desiring above all else to remain at
that center. (Dennett 1989b, p. 23)
Applying the intentional stance in that way to predict the ‘behavior’ of
a lectern has not much predictive power as there is no interesting behavior
at all. However, also applying the intentional stance, e.g., to an oscillat-
ing pendulum fails although the system is actually exhibiting some temporal
dynamics. The reason for this is that even a simple oscillation is (in the
ideal case without any friction) a stationary and hence an equilibrium state.
The only ‘desire’ that can be ascribed to an equilibrium system is ‘I wish
to remain in my current state’, which is obviously lacking much predictive
power. Relevant attributions of desires and consequently of beliefs there-
fore require nonequilibrium dynamical systems that attempt to reach some
‘desired’ attractor or steady state.
Another necessary condition for an intentional system is nonlinearity.
This becomes evident in the light of the fact that linear dynamical systems
exhibit rather trivial behaviors, namely essentially oscillation and relaxation
processes. Yet, in order to talk about an intentional system, it must be
an individual object, distinguishable from its environment as a dynamically
organized complex ‘pattern of reality’ (Primas 1990b, p. 245). Such pat-
terns, like the magnetic surface swimmers from the introduction, can only
emerge via processes of self-organization or self-assembly, requiring nonlinear
dynamics.
The last necessary condition for an intentional system is dissipation which
means that the system can be described through the design stance in a func-
tional way: it maintains its existence by dissipating energy (Tschacher and
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Haken 2007). Thus, an intentional system must be nonlinear dissipative
nonequilibrium systems as a necessary condition.
Finally, the necessary condition for a true believer is to be an intentional
system, i.e. a system that is reliably predictable by means of the intentional
strategy (Dennett 1989b, p. 29).
To summarize the necessary conditions of the intentional hierarchy: (1)
true believers, among other intentional systems must be physical systems
which provide the common ground of my argument. From these one has
to exclude (2) all equilibrium systems as they do not exhibit any temporal
behavior that could lead to prediction problems. (3) A nonequilibrium sys-
tem must be governed by nonlinear physical laws that allow for structure
formation through self-organization and self-assembly; without nonlinearity
one cannot speak about an individual system with complex temporal behav-
ior. (4) Nonlinear nonequilibrium systems must be dissipative in order to be
describable by the design stance: they are individual patterns functioning as
energy-dissipators. (5) Intentional systems are systems for which the inten-
tional strategy works. (6) True believers are necessarily intentional systems.
The following subsections elucidate how to implement stability criteria as
sufficient conditions for the contextual emergence of intentionality.
4.1 Contextual emergence of phenomenal laws
Thermal equilibrium systems as discussed in the previous section are sta-
tionary systems, i.e. their statistical states do not change in time. However,
for the discussion of intentionality at the level of physical systems one has to
look at time-dependent solutions of the evolution law for statistical states.9
Such solutions are not available in the context of thermal equilibrium
which has therefore to be relaxed toward local equilibrium holding within
the fluid’s volume elements. Under this assumption, a nonlinear differential
equation describing the dynamics of an ideal fluid, published by Leonhard
Euler in 1757, is contextually emergent.10
9 This law is the Boltzmann equation, a master equation for the probability distribution
density of molecules in phase space. In the context of thermal equilibrium the stationary
solution of the Boltzmann equation is the ideal gas law (Pitaevskii and Lifshitz 1981).
10 Time-dependency of the Boltzmann equation is described by the so-called substantial
derivative consisting of a time derivative and the product of the fluid’s velocity and a
14
Yet, the hydrodynamical Euler equation does not account for friction
and dissipation.11 In order to achieve this, one has to choose another context
where these details are not longer considered to be irrelevant.12 The resulting
evolution law is the so-called Navier-Stokes equation for the velocity field,
which is, like the Euler equation, a nonlinear phenomenal law, describing
convection and dissipation in fluids. Contextual properties that are due to the
Navier-Stokes equation are particularly fluidity, surface tension, convection
and waves. For a more general discussion of the contextual emergence of
fluid dynamics see Bishop (2008, 2012).
4.2 Contextual emergence of complex systems
The contextually emergent, phenomenal nonlinear dissipative Navier-Stokes
equation is the core of the self-assembly model of Belkin et al. (2010) for
magnetic surface swimmers (Snezhko et al. 2006, Belkin et al. 2007, Snezhko
et al. 2009). Together with the conservation of fluid13 and with Newton’s
laws for linear acceleration and torque, coupled to the alternating magnetic
forcing, these physical laws describe the processes of self-organization and
self-assembly of magnetic surface swimmers as individual complex patterns
that can be subjected to the intentional strategy.
These pattern formation processes require a hierarchy of self-assembly
steps that are depicted in Figs. 3 and 4.
spatial gradient. For local equilibrium, the nonlinear Euler equation emerges after plugging
in the fluid’s mean velocity to the substantial derivative which creates a mathematical
self-reference (Pitaevskii and Lifshitz 1981). Similar examples of emergent nonlinearity
through self-reference have been discussed by Primas (1990a).
11 This became manifest whence Euler who was appointed to the Royal Prussian
Academy of Science in 1741 by king Frederick II, was asked for a scientific expertise
about the fountains in Potsdam Sanssouci gardens. He calculated the dimensions of the
required wooden pipes using his hydrodynamic equations. After building pipes and foun-
tains in way he had suggested they all cracked. This was because Euler neglected friction
and dissipation. (Go¨tz 1983)
12 Formally, this is carried out by a series expansion of the statistical states around local
equilibrium (Pitaevskii and Lifshitz 1981).
13 Accounted for by a continuity equation.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3: Self-assembly of magnetic surface swimmer’s chain structures.
(a) Alignment of nickel spheres’ magnetic moments along a static external
magnetic field. (b) Rotation of spheres’ magnetic moment induced by a
periodic external magnetic field. (c) Pumping of surrounding water caused
by rotating spheres. (d) Alignment of spheres’ magnetic moments to form a
dipole chain.
Figure 3(a) shows how ferromagnetic microspheres that are supported by
the fluid’s — contextually emergent —- surface tension align along a static
external magnetic field. The repelling forces prevent them from approaching
each other too close. However, for a periodically modulated magnetic field
the situation is different. According to Fig. 3(b) the magnetic forcing causes
the spheres to rotate. Thereby, a velocity gradient is created in the sur-
rounding fluid. Due to the presence of — contextually emergent —- friction
this gradient becomes amplified until it leads to relocation of flowing fluid
as shown in Fig. 3(c). At some point in time, the magnetic moments of two
spheres swimming at different surface heights become attractive. Then they
align as displayed in Fig. 3(d). This process continues for all spheres at the
same side of the surface scarp until they form a magnetic chain.
Through their rotations the spheres exert pressures on the water surface
yielding a wave-like pattern that acts as an order parameter in synergetics
(Haken 1983): due to gravitational force, chains become accelerated along
the wave scarps such that they align in parallel along one wave front. Accord-
ingly, wave crests get depleted from microspheres by this interaction between
the surface shape and the particles. This leads to the formation of segments
16
as shown in Fig. 4.14
Figure 4: Self-assembly of magnetic surface swimmer’s segment structures.
Two anti-ferromagnetic segments drag and pull the surrounding water under
the external periodic driving.
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Every two adjacent segments in Fig. 4 act like a pair of bellows operated
by the periodic magnetic forcing that pumps water along the main axis of
the surface swimmer. Therefore, the whole structure acts like two linear
motors creating a quadrupolar vortex field. As long as both tails produce
the same stream, the magnetic surface swimmer stalls somewhere swirling
the surrounding fluid. However, for a critical frequency of the driving field
this symmetry is spontaneously broken and the object begins moving around.
Moreover, this symmetry breaking has also been caused by bringing a plastic
bead into the swimmer’s environment. At some point in time this bead
becomes attached to the head of a structure that transforms into a moving
and hunting predator.
So far all these self-assembly processes can be conceived as the necessary
conditions for the emergence of a magnetic surface swimmer. The contin-
gent contexts and their stability criteria as sufficient conditions are rather
concealed. Here, the context is given by the particular experimental setup
imposing several constraints upon the system and its theoretical investiga-
tion (Bishop 2008, 2012). Surface swimmers would not emerge in a random
combination of nickel particles, water and a magnetic field. One important
contextual constraint is the amount of water in the beaker which must not
be too deep.16
Though, an even more crucial point is that magnetic surface swimmers
14 Where two succeeding segments are anti-ferromagnetically oriented.
15Cf. http://mti.msd.anl.gov/highlights/snakes/coupling.gif
16 This constraint is expressed by the so-called shallow water approximation for solving
the Navier-Stokes equation (Belkin et al. 2010).
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in particular and intentional systems in general exhibit characteristic contex-
tual symmetries. These can be geometric symmetries such as the global axial
symmetry from head to tail or the local translational symmetries between ad-
jacent segments or between adjacent chains within one segment of a surface
swimmer. These can also be material symmetries such as the permutation
symmetry of constituents: One could easily exchange the positions of two
nickel spheres A and B or of two water molecules C and D without changing
the entire structure. Or likewise one could exchange one of these building
blocks with any other one taken from the universe without perturbing the
systems’ functionality. The existence of symmetries indicates that intentional
systems are functional patterns which can be described by means of the de-
sign stance. Therefore, these systems belong to an ontologically higher level
of description than the underlying physical processes of self-organization and
self-assembly. Patterns are equivalence classes of physical entities that can be
multiple realized (in the sense of supervenience). Symmetry transformations
leave the magnetic surface swimmer invariant because they are irrelevant for
the functioning and predictability of the structures.
This accords precisely with Dennett’s objection to the Martian argument
that there is ‘something perfectly objective: the patterns in human behav-
ior’ Dennett (1989b, p. 25). However, this objectivity is induced by the
invariance of structures against material permutations which is contextu-
ally grounded in the observer’s pattern matching capabilities (Primas 1990b,
1998)17 and the observer’s perspective evaluation of relevant properties.18
4.3 Contextual emergence of intentional systems
As another example for a nonlinear dissipative nonequilibrium system one
may next consider a damped pendulum that approaches its resting state in
the course of damped oscillations. Would an observer predict this rather
trivial behavior by means of the intentional stance? Probably yes, at least at
a first glance, saying that the system desires to come to rest, believing that
damped oscillations are the most rational pathway toward this goal. But
17 Consequently, there are no ‘Laplacean methods’ for predicting complex systems at
the physical stance because physical science is constituted by certain regulative principles
describing how observers deal with experimental arrangements and with phenomenal laws
under perspective decisions (Primas 1990b). Also imagined Martian ‘super-physicists’ had
to develop statistical physics and hydrodynamics in order to manage physics.
18 Cf. Dennett (1989b, p. 18).
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after oscillations have died out, the system becomes similarly uninteresting
as the lectern in the center of the universe. What makes the difference to
the much more appealing magnetic surface swimmers?
The obvious difference is that the surface swimmers present an open sys-
tem that is constantly pumped with magnetic energy. This energy has to be
dissipated by the generation of heat. In this respect the surface swimmers
resemble another hydrodynamic system, namely Rayleigh-Be´nard convection
(Bishop 2008, Tschacher and Haken 2007). Here, a fluid layer is heated from
the bottom and cooled at the top, thereby prescribing a temperature gradi-
ent as a control parameter. When this gradient is below a critical threshold
the system clears this perturbation through heat conduction. However, when
the temperature gradient exceeds this threshold, the system undergoes a dy-
namic instability where convection sets in. Depending on the constraints of
the experimental setup, different modes of convection compete against each
other until a winning mode shapes up as an order parameter enslaving the
inferior modes (Haken 1983, Tschacher and Haken 2007).
Tschacher and Haken (2007) use this paradigmatic example of synergetics
for illustrating their concept of apparent intentionality :19
Heat convection is realized through the extended coordinated
motions — so-called roll patterns — of the components in the
fluid system . . . self-organization in this system is caused by en-
vironmental conditions — in this case, by the difference in tem-
perature. In turn, however, self-organization exerts an influence
on the environment as well. Because the self-organizing system
tends to decrease the temperature difference, the environment
must react in order to maintain the prescribed difference, i.e. the
prescribed control parameter. Hence, the emergence of order pa-
rameters may be seen as having a virtual impact on the control
parameters which led to order in the first place. In addition to
the circular relation between order parameters and components
as specified in synergetics, a second circularity is found in systems
that thrive on gradients . . . . (Tschacher and Haken 2007, p. 6)
In other words, the control parameter, namely the temperature gradi-
ent, causes the self-organization of the order parameter, i.e. convection roll
19 See also the neural network account of Haken and Tschacher (2010).
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patterns. The order parameter in turn attempts to clear the gradient by
means of dissipation. This circular causality (or downward causation (Bishop
2008, 2012)) strongly resembles the intentional strategy where beliefs become
manifest through the desires attributed to a system, whereas desires become
manifest through the beliefs attributed to a system (Dennett 1978b, p. 8).
Here are another two necessary ingredients for the contextual emergence
of intentional systems: the patterns (e.g. convection rolls in the Rayleigh-
Be´nard system or magnetic surface swimmers) must respond to externally
applied gradients, i.e. the system must be open, forced by the environment.
And in addition, the system must be in a state of criticality where it has
different ‘choices’ how to clear the exerted gradients.
The latter point gives rise to the sufficient condition and its implemen-
tation as a stability criterion, which is nothing else than the Second Law of
thermodynamics, restated and extended to nonequilibrium dynamical sys-
tems:
The thermodynamic principle which governs the behaviour of sys-
tems is that, as they are moved away from equilibrium they will
utilize all avenues available to counter the applied gradients. As
the applied gradients increase, so does the system’s ability to op-
pose further movement from equilibrium. (Schneider and Kay
1994, p. 29)
This means that a system expelled from equilibrium by external gradients
responds in the most optimal way to get rid of the gradients. Tschacher and
Haken (2007, p. 7) write:
• Self-organisation and thermodynamics : Self-organization phe-
nomena can be treated in connection with a restated second
law of thermodynamics. The consequence of spontaneous
increase of order in an open system can be discussed as a
corollary of the second law.
• The functionalist view of self-organization: The restated sec-
ond law regards pattern formation in the service of gradient
reduction. Thus, pattern formation is functional; it may
‘look’ intentional.
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• Optimality of self-organization: In principle, there may be
several patterns, each of which can be functional in reduc-
ing the gradients imposed on the system. These patterns
can be attributed to different efficiencies. If a specific pat-
tern provides the optimal (most efficient) way to dissipate
the gradients, precisely this pattern will be realized in the
system. The better dissipative pathway is the preferred one.
Therefore, the sufficient condition for the contextual emergence of inten-
tional systems is precisely Dennett’s rationality assumption:
A prediction relying on the assumption of the system’s rationality
is relative to a number of things. First, rationality here so far
means nothing more than optimal design relative to a goal or
optimal weighted hierarchy of goals . . . and a set of constraints
. . . (Dennett 1978b, pp. 4f)
In this sense, the Rayleigh-Be´nard system behaves rational since it ‘prefers’
convection rolls over heat conduction as the optimal pathway for dissipating
energy. In the same way, the magnetic surface swimmers behave rational
as they ‘prefer’ swimming around than standing still. For them, swimming
around and hunting nickel spheres is even more rational because they could
grow, thus becoming faster and leveraging their efficacy for dissipating en-
ergy.20
4.4 Contextual emergence of true believers
Intentional systems such as the Rayleigh-Be´nard system or magnetic surface
swimmers can be treated by the intentional stance as if they had beliefs
and desires. How to distinguish them from systems that really have be-
liefs and desires (Dennett 1989b, p. 22), i.e. from ‘true believers’ (Dennett
1989b, p. 19)? This must be achieved by remedying the irritating observer-
dependence of intentionality (Dennett 1989b, pp. 23f), or in other words by
20 Another criterion that has been suggested for the emergence of intentionality is self-
sustainment (Jordan and Ghin 2006, Jordan and Heidenreich 2010): Self-sustaining sys-
tems have the capability to retroact upon their defining contingent contexts. This might
introduce another level within the intentional hierarchy Fig. 2.
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making intentional ascriptions objective. But what does objectivity mean in
contemporary, operationalistic science?
Basically, objectivity refers to invariance through symmetry: a natural
law holds objectively because it holds always and everywhere in the uni-
verse and for every observer who is able and competent to replicate an ob-
servational setup. In other words, objective judgments are invariant under
exchanging observers.
This must also hold for the attribution of intentional states as well in or-
der to talk about true believers. Therefore, a true believer is an intentional
system — providing the necessary condition — which is stable under per-
mutation of observers — implementing the sufficient condition as a stability
criterion. In particular, a true believer must be able to ascribe intention-
ality to its own behavior (reflexivity) and when an observer A adopts the
intentional stance for predicting B’s behavior, B must be able to adopt the
intentional stance for the prediction of A’s behavior as well (symmetry). Fi-
nally when A ascribes intentional states to B and B does the same with C, A
must be able to attribute intentionality to C also (transitivity). Accordingly,
true believers comprise an equivalence class through ‘the unavoidability of the
intentional stance with regard to oneself and one’s fellow intelligent beings ’
(Dennett 1989b, p. 27). They reciprocally ascribe intentional states to each
other in the course of reliable and respectful communication.
5 Discussion
Illustrated by means of the intriguing example of self-assembling magnetic
surface swimmers (Snezhko et al. 2006, Belkin et al. 2007, Snezhko et al.
2009) which can be described — at least to some extent — by attributing
beliefs and desires to them according to the intentional strategy (Dennett
1978b, 1989b), I have reconstructed a hierarchy of necessary and sufficient
conditions for the applicability of this strategy (Fig. 2). It has turned out
that these conditions demand a similar operationalistic treatment as Den-
nett’s approach. While the intentional strategy is adopted by an observer in
order to predict the behavior of a system under consideration, the different
levels of the intentional hierarchy emerge by selecting appropriate contexts
through an observer. These contexts define the relevant conditions that are
sufficient for each level by imposing stability constraints upon the subjacent
22
level in the framework of contextual emergence (Bishop and Atmanspacher
2006, Atmanspacher and Bishop 2007).
At the lowest level of the hierarchy, phenomenal physical laws emerge for
the coarse-grained description of open, nonlinear, and dissipative nonequi-
librium systems in critical states. One level higher, dynamic patterns, such
as, e.g., magnetic surface swimmers, are contextually emergent as they are
invariant (and hence stable) under certain symmetry operations. Again one
level up, these patterns select optimal pathways for the dissipation of energy
that is delivered by external gradients. Thus, these patterns behave ratio-
nally in accordance with the restated Second Law of thermodynamics as
stability criterion. At the highest level, true believers are intentional systems
that are stable under exchanging their observation conditions.
All these different levels of description are pervaded by one thread: the
prevalence of the observer. According to Dennett it is always an observer
who employs one of the three stances: the physical stance, the design stance,
or the intentional stance, e.g. facing a chess computer:
The decision to adopt the strategy is pragmatic, and is not in-
trinsically right or wrong. One can always refuse to adopt the
intentional stance toward the computer, and accept its check-
mates. One can switch stances at will without involving oneself
in any inconsistencies or inhumanities, adopting the intentional
stance in one’s role as opponent, the design stance in one’s role
as redesigner, and the physical stance in one’s role as repairman.
(Dennett 1978b, p. 7)
Likewise, it is always the observer who selects a suitable context for de-
scribing properties of natural phenomena. And finally, only observers are
able to treat each others as intentional systems. Thus I conclude that true
believers are real observers (beim Graben 2011).
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